Racial Profiling under Attack by Gross, Samuel R. & Livingston, D.
University of Michigan Law School 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository 
Articles Faculty Scholarship 
2002 
Racial Profiling under Attack 
Samuel R. Gross 
University of Michigan Law School, srgross@umich.edu 
D. Livingston 
Columbia Law School 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1589 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles 
 Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Law and Race 
Commons, and the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Gross, Samuel R. "Racial Profiling under Attack." D. Livingston, co-author. Colum. L. Rev. 102, no. 5 (2002): 
1413-38. 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
ESSAY
RACIAL PROFILING UNDER ATTACK
Samuel R. Gross*
Debra Livingston**
The events of September 11, 2001, have sparked a fierce debate over
racial profiling. Many who readily condemned the practice a year ago have
had second thoughts. In the wake of September 11, the Department ofJustice
initiated a program of interviewing thousands of men who arrived in this
country in the past two years from countries with an al Qaeda presence-a
program that some attack as racial profiling, and others defend as proper
law enforcement. In this Essay, Professors Gross and Livingston use that
program as the focus of a discussion of the meaning of racial profiling, its
use in a variety of contexts, and its relationship to other police practices that
take race or ethnicity into account.
INTRODUCTION
We had just reached a consensus on racial profiling. By September
10, 2001, virtually everyone, from Jesse Jackson to Al Gore to George W.
Bush to John Ashcroft, agreed that racial profiling was very bad. We also
knew what racial profiling was: Police officers would stop, question, and
search African American and Hispanic citizens disproportionately, be-
cause of their race or ethnicity, in order to try to catch common
criminals. All this has changed in the wake of the September 11 attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Now racial profiling is
more likely to mean security checks or federal investigations that target
Muslim men from Middle Eastern countries, in order to try to catch ter-
rorists. And now lots of people are for it. In the fall of 1999, 81% of
respondents in a national poll said they disapproved of "racial profiling,"
which was defined as the practice by some police officers of stopping
"motorists of certain racial or ethnic groups because the officers believe
that these groups are more likely than others to commit certain types of
crimes."' Two years later, 58% said they favored "requiring Arabs, includ-
ing those who are U.S. citizens, to undergo special, more intensive secur-
* Thomas & Mabel Long Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School.
** Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. The authors thank Karima Benoune,
Harold Edgar, Phoebe Ellsworth, James Forman, Saul Green, Gerard Lynch, William
Stuntz, and Richard Uviller for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Scott Laton, Anna-
Rose Mathieson, and Katherine Taylor for research assistance. This work was supported in
part by funds from the Cook endowment of the University of Michigan Law School.
1. Gallup Poll, Sept. 24, 1999-Nov. 16, 1999, Public Opinion Online, The Roper
Center at the University of Connecticut, available at LEXIS, News Library, Rpoll file
[hereinafter Roper Data Base] (describing results from question 1, accession #0346115,
and question 9, accession #0346123).
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ity checks before boarding airplanes in the U.S." 2 This new attitude has
emerged across the political spectrum.3 Even as stalwart a civil libertarian
as Floyd Abrams, the celebrated First Amendment lawyer, has said that
under the circumstances we now face, "it seems entirely appropriate to
look harder at such people. Remember, Justice [Robert] Jackson said
'the Constitution is not a suicide pact."' 4
Needless to say, racial profiling has not become a national fad. Most
newfound supporters are reluctant and ambivalent, and most public offi-
cials continue to say they oppose the practice. There is certainly no new
national consensus in favor of racial profiling. Quite the opposite: The
antiterrorist investigations that followed September 11 have generated a
fresh set of controversies over the issue. But the nature of the debate has
changed. Before September 11, the disputes appeared to be factual.
Critics would argue that the police acted on the basis of race, and the
police would deny it. Now the differences are more likely to be defini-
tional or frankly normative: Does it constitute racial profiling to do what
the Department of Justice says it is doing? And if so, are the Depart-
ment's actions nevertheless justified?
To our minds, neither the pre- nor the post-September 11 debates
have been very illuminating. The problem may be that before September
11 there was too much agreement on the issue, at least on the surface.
Racial profiling continued to occur, as it does today, but since no public
official would defend it, the game turned entirely on labeling. If a prac-
tice was successfully tagged as racial profiling, the cops lost; if not, they
won. Since September 11, the debate has shifted but not deepened-at
least not appreciably. The division now is between those who say that we
can no longer afford to reject racial profiling out of hand, and those who
insist that this is a principle that must not be compromised. In both set-
tings, before September 11 and after, no one has stopped to analyze what
racial profiling is, and what makes it stand out as a special law enforce-
ment problem. This Essay addresses these questions.
2. Id. (describing results from question 1, accession #0387144, from the Sept. 14,
2001 Gallup Poll); see also David E. Rovella, Pro-Police Opinions on the Rise, Poll Says
Wiretaps, Profiling Gain Juror Support, Nat'l L.J.,Jan. 21, 2002, at Al (finding that 59% of
adults eligible for jury duty say that profiling is acceptable in certain circumstances).
3. See, e.g., Stanley Crouch, Drawing the Line on Racial Profiling, N.Y. Daily News,
Oct. 4, 2001, at 41 (arguing that current Arab American profiling differs from African
American profiling); Editorial, Profiling Debate Resumes, Denver Post, Oct. 3, 2001, at B6
(suggesting that race should be taken into account in finding law enforcement targets);
Michael Kinsley, When Is Racial Profiling Okay?, Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 2001, at B7 (arguing
that racial profiling is sometimes appropriate, and may be acceptable at airport security
checkpoints); Dorothy Rabinowitz, Hijacking History, Wall St. J., Dec. 7, 2001, at A18
(arguing that Arab American profiling is markedly different from past forms of racial
profiling); Stephen J. Singer, Racial Profiling Also Has a Good Side, Newsday, Sept. 25,
2001, at A38 (suggesting that race, in conjunction with other factors, can signal the need
for further investigation).
4. Henry Weinstein et al., Racial Profiling Gains Support as Search Tactic, L.A. Times,
Sept. 24, 2001, at Al (discussing airport security).
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We do not expect to change people's minds or to resolve differences
of opinion about the appropriateness of programs that have been called
racial profiling. We do not entirely agree with each other. Nor do we
present a general normative theory of racial profiling or a detailed legal
analysis. Our goal is more limited: to shed some light on the underlying
issues by examining racial profiling in the context of other police prac-
tices that take race or ethnicity into account. Some of these practices are
among the worst expressions of racism in modern America, while others
are perfectly justified. To locate a police practice along this range we
need to know in concrete detail not just who the authorities target, and
why, but what they do to these people and why they do it. The label
"racial profiling," however carefully applied, is not very informative.
I.
As we use the term, "racial profiling" occurs whenever a law enforce-
ment officer questions, stops, arrests, searches, or otherwise investigates a
person because the officer believes that members of that person's racial
or ethnic group are more likely than the population at large to commit
the sort of crime the officer is investigating. The essence of racial profil-
ing is a global judgment that the targeted group-before September 11,
usually African Americans or Hispanics-is more prone to commit crime
in general, or to commit a particular type of crime, than other racial or
ethnic groups. If the officer's conduct is based at least in part on such a
general racial or ethnic judgment, it does not matter if she uses other
criteria as well in deciding on her course of action. It is racial profiling to
target young black men on the basis of a belief that they are more likely
than others to commit crimes, even though black women and older black
men are not directly affected. 5
It is not racial profiling for an officer to question, stop, search, arrest,
or otherwise investigate a person because his race or ethnicity matches
information about a perpetrator of a specific crime that the officer is in-
vestigating. That use of race-which usually occurs when there is a ra-
cially specific description of the criminal-does not entail a global judg-
ment about a racial or ethnic group as a whole. Likewise, a deliberate
practice of discrimination between known suspects of different races-
stopping all speeders but giving tickets to black drivers only, and warn-
ings to whites-is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, but it is not racial profiling. Racial profiling can oc-
cur in almost any type of criminal investigation. It has received particular
attention in the context of highway drug interdiction, and more recently,
of course, in investigations of terrorism.
5. For a similar definition, see Deborah Ramirez et al., A Resource Guide on Racial
Profiling Data Collection Systems (Nov. 2000) (defining racial profiling as relying on race
rather than behavior in police initiated actions), at http://www.usdoj.gov/cops/pdf/cp_
resources/pubs-prod/police-practices-handout/Section6.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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Others have offered somewhat different definitions of racial profil-
ing.6 We are satisfied with our own definition, even though, as we will
see, some cases cannot be neatly classified. We will not defend it at any
length, however, because one of our main points is that it is a mistake to
focus excessively on labels.
We will discuss the constitutionality of racial profiling equally briefly.
A pair of comparatively old Supreme Court cases suggests that under the
Fourth Amendment it is constitutional to use race as one factor among
several for a decision to stop a person, but not as the sole basis.7 Some
courts continue to follow that rule;8 others have held that race may not
be included in a profile that is used as a basis for individualized suspicion
under the Fourth Amendment.9 Racial profiling may also be challenged
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10
The Equal Protection Clause applies to all government action, including
early stages of police investigations-surveillance in public places, ostensi-
bly noncoercive questioning, requests for consent to conduct searches-
that are not governed by the Fourth Amendment because they do not
6. Some states, agencies, and law enforcement organizations define racial profiling
narrowly as police initiated conduct that is based exclusively or solely on race. See, e.g., Md.
Code Ann., Transp. II § 25-113 (Michie Supp. 2001) (prohibiting use of race as sole
justification for traffic stop); R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-21.1-2 (2000) (defining racial profiling as
police action based solely on a person's race); Portland Police Bureau, Community
Policing News, (Dec. 2000-Jan. 2001) (defining racial profiling as "[t] he use of race as the
sole basis for justifying traffic stops or other police action"), at http://www.portlandpolice
bureau.com/newsl200.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Other agencies and
law enforcement associations have defined racial profiling more broadly as police action
that is based on a suspect's race, even in combination with other factors. See, e.g., Office
of the Att'y Gen., Ariz., Report on Racial Profiling (Jan. 2001) (asking law enforcement
agencies to prohibit any reliance on race and/or ethnicity in stopping suspects), at http://
www.ag.state.az.us/law.enforcement/racial%20profiling.pdf (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Tucson Police Dep't, General Orders, Constitutional Issues (May 2001)
(prohibiting any consideration of race or ethnicity "except where race or ethnicity is part
of an identifying description or characteristic of a possible suspect"), at http://www.ci.
tucson.az.us./police/PublicInfo/general-orders/general-orders.html (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); Int'l Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, Sample Professional Traffic Stops
Policy and Procedure, at http://www.theiacp.org/documents/index.cfm?fuseaction=docu
ment&document#id=139 (last visited Feb. 7, 2002) (prohibiting use of race as a profile
factor in determining probable cause) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). We have
rejected the narrow definition because other factors are inevitably considered by the
police. See infra text accompanying note 58.
7. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 565-66 (1976); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 887-88 (1975).
8. See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir. 1992); Castaneda v.
Commonwealth, 376 S.E.2d 82, 83, 86 (Va. Ct. App. 1989).
9. See United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000);
Whitfield v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 837 F. Supp. 338, 340, 344 (D. Colo. 1993); People v. Bower,
597 P.2d 115, 119 (Cal. 1979); State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986).
10. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
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involve "searches" or "seizures." 1 Under general equal protection princi-
ples, it may be that racial profiling, as we define it, is generally prohibited,
at least in the absence of a finding that it is "narrowly tailored" to serve a
"compelling state interest."'12 On the other hand, the common Fourth
Amendment remedy-suppression-may not be available for equal pro-
tection violations;13 and in general, equal protection law in this area is
not well developed. Any uncertainties about the legal status of racial pro-
filing, however, do not concern us here because our focus is on the social,
political, and moral issues that surround the practice.
II.
We will focus our discussion of racial and ethnic profiling on a con-
crete example. In November 2001, the Department of Justice began ef-
forts to interview "more than 5,000 people nationwide-the majority Mid-
dle Eastern men ages eighteen to thirty-three who came here within the
last two years on nonimmigrant visas-in search of information on terror-
ist organizations such as al Qaeda.' 4 Four months later, the Justice De-
partment announced that it would seek to interview 3,000 additional
men, ages eighteen to forty-six, who entered the United States on nonim-
migrant visas, between October 2001 and February 2002, from countries
with an al Qaeda presence. 15 The Department said that these men are
not suspected of crimes but "might, either wittingly or unwittingly, be in
the same circles, communities, or social groups as those engaged in ter-
rorist activities."' 6
Is the Justice Department's interview campaign an ethnic profiling
program? Some civil libertarians, Arab American organizations, and lo-
11. E.g., United States v. Avery, 137 F.3d 343, 353 (6th Cir. 1998) (applying equal
protection analysis to pre-contact stages of criminal investigation); United States v. Travis,
62 F.3d 170, 172-76 (6th Cir. 1995) (same).
12. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486 (1989)
(invalidating city's plan to set aside 30% of its construction budget for "Minority Business
Enterprises" because the set-aside "was not narrowly tailored to accomplish a remedial
purpose").
13. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461 n.2 (1996); see also Travis, 62 F.3d
at 174 (finding it unnecessary to decide whether equal protection violation in police
investigation requires suppression of evidence). See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Race,
Rights and Remedies in Criminal Adjudication, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 2001, 2004 (1998)
(exploring "the complications that arise in the definition of rights and in the operation of
remedies when the Equal Protection Clause is used in criminal adjudication").
14. Allan Lengel, Arab Men in Detroit to be Asked to See U.S. Attorney, Wash. Post,
Nov. 27, 2001, at A5. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General, to All United
States Attorneys and All Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9, 2001)
(describing the manner of conducting interviews and topics to be covered), available at
http://www.freepress.com/gallery/2001/interviews/index.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
15. See New Round of Interviews Planned with Foreigners, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 2002,
at A8; Jonathan Peterson, U.S. Will Interview More Foreigners in Fight on Terrorism, L.A.
Times, Mar. 21, 2002, at A20 (citing number of interviews planned).
16. Peterson, supra note 15 (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft).
14172002]
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cal police departments say it is; 17 the Department of Justice says it is
not.18 Who is right? And would answering this question tell us whether
the Justice Department's program is appropriate? We will discuss these
questions in the context of five factors. Some are staples of racial profil-
ing debates; in fact, the first factor we address is generally treated as the
sole defining issue. Others, however, are usually ignored, or are treated
as involving background information rather than critical facts. In actual
cases-as we will see in the discussion of several concrete examples-
these factors are often inextricably intertwined.
A. Is the Investigation Based on Race or Ethnicity?
In 1994, the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") launched
an aggressive anti-gun campaign that resulted in the stopping and frisk-
ing of tens of thousands of young black and Hispanic men. 19 Critics
charged the Police Department with racial profiling.20 The Department
replied that it deployed its officers in high-crime neighborhoods that are
mostly minority dominated, and that the racial breakdown of those
stopped corresponded to the racial makeup of victim descriptions of the
perpetrators of violent crime, those arrested for violent crimes in New
York City, and those described in 911 calls as carrying guns.2 ' In a con-
17. See Fox Butterfield, Police are Split on Questioning of Mideast Men, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 22, 2001, at Al (discussing mixed reactions of local police departments to the justice
Department's interview program); Lisa Biank Fasig, ACLU Urges Police: Refuse to Help
U.S. Government Detain Immigrants, Providence J.-Bull., Dec. 3, 2001, at B3 (noting
charge of ACLU official that interview program is "nothing but thinly disguised racial
profiling"); Chisun Lee, Let Us Not Be Suckers For Anybody, Village Voice, Jan. 1, 2002, at
52 (asserting that "[t]he question today isn't whether law enforcement is engaging in racial
profiling, it's how much"); Jim Schaefer, FBI to Question 840 Middle Eastern Men in
Detroit Area, Detroit Free Press, Nov. 16, 2001 (reporting anger of Arab leaders and civil
rights activists).
18. Michael Chertoff, Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing on
Preserving Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism, Federal News Service, Nov. 28,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File, All.
19. The NYPD's strategic plan was articulated in a public document issued by the
Department. New York Police Dep't, Police Strategy No. 1, Getting Guns Off the Streets of
New York (1994). In 1999, New York's Attorney General issued a report in response to
public concern about the impact of the use of aggressive stop-and-frisk tactics upon
minority communities in New York City. This report analyzed some 175,000 "UF-250s"-
forms that NYPD officers were required to complete after many "stop" encounters-for the
period of January 1, 1998 through March 31, 1999. This report concluded that about 51%
of all persons "stopped" during the period were black and 33% were Hispanic. Office of
Att'y Gen., New York, The New York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices 94
(Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter OAG Report], available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
reports/stopfrisk/stopfrisk.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
20. See U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights, Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York
City ch. 5, 16 (Aug. 2000) (noting that NYPD's stop and frisk data "strongly suggest that
racial profiling plays some role in the stop and frisk practices of the overall Department").
21. See Safir Testimony before the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, New York
Hearing Transcript 165 (May 26, 1999); see also NYPD Response to the Draft Report of the
U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights-Police Practices and Civil Rights in New York City,
[Vol. 102:14131418
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text like that, it can be difficult to disentangle the competing factual
claims and decide whether the NYPD deliberately relied on race in carry-
ing out its anti-gun campaign. For the investigation we are focusing on,
however, the Department ofJustice has made the task somewhat easier by
publicly acknowledging that it is seeking to interview primarily Middle
Eastern men who have recently arrived from countries with an active al
Qaeda presence. 22
Is this ethnic profiling? In testimony before the Senate Judiciary
Committee, Assistant Attorney General Michael Chertoff, who heads the
Justice Department's Criminal Division, said no: "We have emphatically
rejected ethnic profiling. What we have looked to are characteristics like
country of issuance of passport .... ,"23 There is an important difference
between ethnicity and nationality-and one with significant legal conse-
quences. 24 But in this context, the distinction may seem thin. As Justice
Brennan pointed out in his concurrence in Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazraji: "The line between discrimination based on 'ancestry or ethnic
characteristics' and discrimination based on 'place or nation of... ori-
gin,' is not a bright one."25 The Department's focus on visitors from
countries with an active al Qaeda presence has admittedly produced an
Executive Summary 13 (2000); Press Release, Police Commissioner Safir Comments on
State Attorney General's Stop and Frisk Report (Nov. 30, 1999) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
22. See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note at 17 (citing statement by FBI agent in charge of
interview program in Detroit that interviews "could be seen as profiling" because "all the
men are Middle Eastern"). Justice Department investigators have stated that the interview
program focuses on individuals arriving on nonimmigrant visas from nations where the al
Qaeda network is active. See Peterson, supra note 15. Subjects of the interview program
include visitors to the United States from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia,
countries that do not fit any definition of the term "Middle Eastern" (itself a vague
geographical designation). Telephone Interview with John Bell, Special Agent in Charge
of DOJ Interview Program for the E.D. Mich. FBI (Feb. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Telephone
Interview with John Bell]. The acknowledged fact that the interview list is composed
primarily of Muslim men from the Middle East, however, has resulted in charges of not
only ethnic profiling, but also religious profiling-a separate issue that we do not address.
23. Chertoff, supra note 18.
24. These consequences include differences in the application of the equal
protection clause. Gerald Neuman has explained:
Distinctions in federal law among aliens on the basis of their country of current
nationality are not constitutionally suspect. Bilateral and multilateral treaties
frequently create reciprocal privileges for U.S. citizens and citizens of selected
foreign countries, and some federal legislation extends specific favored treatment
to particular nationalities independent of treaties. If these distinctions are not
defined in terms of race and are not motivated by racial prejudice ... then they
would not elicit heightened scrutiny under ordinary equal protection analysis.
Gerald Neuman, Terrorism, Selective Deportation and the First Amendment after Reno v.
AADC, 14 Geo. Immig. L.J. 313, 339-40 (2000). See also Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee, 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999) (stating that generally "an alien
unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a
defense against his deportation").
25. 481 U.S. 604, 614 (1987).
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interview list that is dominated by Middle Eastern men, which raises the
specter of ethnic profiling. To critics, Mr. Chertoff could as well have
said "we have emphatically rejected age discrimination. What we have
looked to are characteristics like date of issuance of birth certificate." Of
course, no one much cares that the Department may be profiling by age
and sex as well as by ethnicity.
Why did Mr. Chertoff insist on this distinction? He had no choice.
Ten months earlier, Mr. Chertoffs boss, Attorney General John Ashcroft,
declared that "[t]here should be no loopholes or safe harbors for racial
profiling. Official discrimination of this sort is wrong and unconstitu-
tional no matter what the context."26 To admit that the government
made investigative choices based on race or ethnicity seems to admit ra-
cial profiling, which has been defined as so odious that there is no de-
fense. In fact, racial profiling deserves its bad name. There is nojustifica-
tion, for example, for the infamous racial profiling by the Maryland and
New Jersey state police on 1-95, who stopped and searched thousands of
minority motorists in search of drug traffickers,2 7 nor for similar drug
interdiction practices by other police forces across the country.28 The
activists and lawyers who made racial profiling a household word deserve
a great deal of credit for dragging this practice into the light and mobiliz-
ing opposition to it. One result, however, has been to reduce the debate
to a single point. When critics charge: "They're relying on race," the
cops can only reply: "We are not."
But is the Justice Department's interview program ethnic profiling?
The answer is not clear even assuming that ethnicity was a central factor
in the selection of subjects. By our definition, it is not ethnic profiling for
officers to focus their attention on people of a given ethnicity because the
police have information that the specific crime they are investigating was
committed by someone of that ethnic group. There is plenty of informa-
tion that Middle Eastern men, some of whom remain at large, engaged in
a conspiracy to commit acts of mass terror in the United States on Sep-
tember 11, 2001. Granted, the concept of a "specific crime" grows some-
what hazy when the crime at issue is an ongoing conspiracy of indetermi-
nate size-and one that potentially involves notjust Middle Eastern men,
26. Nomination of Senator John Ashcroft to the Office of Attorney General: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (Jan. 22, 2001) (answer from
Senator Ashcroft, to written question submitted by Senator Russell D. Feingold), available
at http://www.senate.gov/~leahy/press/200101/ashcroft.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
27. See State v. Soto, 734 A.2d 350, 352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (focusing on
traffic stops by New Jersey State Police); Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Y. Barnes, Road
Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway 8-18 (Dec. 2001)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
28. Gary Webb, Cal. State Assembly Democratic Caucus Task Force on Gov't
Oversight, Operation Pipeline (1999) (discussing racially disparate impacts of "Operation
Pipeline" in California), available at http://aclunc.org/discrimination/webb-report.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
[Vol. 102:14131420
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but also others, from different racial or ethnic groups. Nevertheless, if
the sole purpose for this interview program was to determine whether any
of the thousands to be interviewed was involved in this conspiracy, or had
information that might lead to those who were, this would not be ethnic
profiling. (Which is not to say that such a broad brush investigation
would be unproblematic; that's a different question, as we will see). On
the other hand, the Justice Department's program would involve ethnic
profiling if it was undertaken even in part based upon a general belief
that Middle Eastern men are more likely to commit acts of terrorism than
people of other ethnic groups-if it was based upon a global assumption
about the criminal propensities of people of Middle Eastern descent. In
practice, it is probably impossible to make that distinction in a case like
this, involving the protracted investigation of a far-flung conspiracy.
B. Is Race (or Ethnicity) a Strong Predictor of Criminal Behavior?
On Sunday, February 28, 1999, Colonel Carl Williams of the New
Jersey State Police told a reporter:
Today with this drug problem, the drug problem is cocaine or
marijuana. It is most likely a minority group that's involved with
that.... If you're looking at the methamphetamine market, that
seems to be controlled by motorcycle gangs, which are basically
predominantly white. If you're looking at heroin and stuff like
that, your involvement there is more or less Jamaicans.
29
Colonel Williams also said: "As far as racial profiling is concerned, that is
absolutely not right. It never has been condoned in the State Police and
it never will be condoned in the State Police."30 Nonetheless, several
hours later, still on Sunday, Governor Christine Todd Whitman fired him
from his job as superintendent of the NewJersey State Police because his
comments, in her words, were "inconsistent with our efforts to enhance
public confidence in the State Police."3
At first blush, Colonel Williams seems to have done no more than
restate the common law enforcement position that minority groups domi-
nate major drug trafficking in the United States.32 Supporters have de-
scribed him as an honest cop who was fired for telling the unpleasant,
politically incorrect truth.33 His specific claims may be debatable; be-
29. Kathy Barrett Carter & Ron Marsico, Whitman Fires Chief of State Police, Star
Ledger, Mar. 1, 1999, at Al.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee (NNICC), The
NNICC Report 1997, The Supply of Illicit Drugs to the United States 11-12 (Nov. 1998)
("Colombia-based traffickers continued to control wholesale level cocaine distribution
throughout the heavily populated northeastern United States . . . often employing
Dominican criminals as subordinates.... In major U.S. cities, organized criminal groups of
Cuban, Jamaican, and Mexican nationals, as well as African-American and ethnic
Dominican gangs, dominated the retail market.").
33. Heather MacDonald, The Myth of Racial Profiling, City J., Spring 2001, at 14, 26.
2002] 1421
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
cause drug dealing is not a victim reported crime, we know little about
the many drug dealers who are never caught. But there is little doubt
about racial differences in other crime rates for which we have more reli-
able data. For instance, victim reports and arrest statistics both show that
African Americans, who constituted roughly 13% of the population, com-
mitted over 40% of the robberies in the United States in 1999, 3 4 and
about half of the homicides. 35 When the New York City Police Depart-
ment cited similar statistics in response to charges of racial profiling,36
their argument was a denial: "We don't target by race, we arrest those
who should be arrested; it is unfortunate that many of them are black and
Hispanic, but this is not our fault."
But Colonel Williams's comments could also be interpreted in a
somewhat different manner, as a defense of racial profiling: "Of course
we stop and search motorists based on their race-because it works. So
cut us some slack." Seen in this light, his firing may not have been en-
tirely unprincipled (especially since, despite his disclaimers, Colonel Wil-
liams seems to have resisted efforts to investigate racial profiling in his
own department).37 Of course he did not say that racial profiling isjusti-
fied, but didn't he imply it? In the political climate of 1999, a police
commander could hardly defend racial profiling directly. The closest he
could come is to say ambiguously that blacks and Hispanics do in fact
commit most of the crimes that matter, and wink.
Before September 11, 2001, a few conservative commentators were
the only people who publicly defended racial profiling on practical
grounds. 38 That has changed. Journalists, politicians, and pollsters have
all expressed and documented a widespread sentiment that in order to
win the "war on terrorism" we must focus our scrutiny on Middle Eastern
Muslim men. 39 The Justice Department's interview program may not be
expressly aimed at such individuals, but it has this effect. It is explicitly
aimed at individuals from Middle Eastern countries and other countries
with an al Qaeda presence-and for good reason. Although other
groups and individuals have committed terrorist acts in the United States,
34. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Criminal Victimization in the
United States, 1999 Statistical Tables tbls.40, 46 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cvus99.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
35. Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics 2000, at 316 tbl.3.150, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/
pdf/section3.pdf (last visited Apr. 22, 2002) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
36. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
37. See Gross & Barnes, supra note 27, at 4-5.
38. See, e.g., John Derbyshire, In Defense of Racial Profiling: Where is Our Common
Sense?, Nat'l Rev., Feb. 19, 2001, at 38, 39 (arguing that police rely on racial stereotypes
"for reasons of simple efficiency"); MacDonald, supra note 33, at 15-20 (arguing that racial
profiling is a minor problem at worst and that it is legitimate for the police to make
investigative choices based on race in conjunction with other factors).
39. See supra notes 2-3; see also Editorial, Terrorist Profiling: Behaviors are
Important Clues, Dallas Morning News, Sept. 24, 2001, at 14A (noting scrutiny of Middle
Eastern men after September 11, 2001).
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before September 11 and probably after, it is very likely true that al
Qaeda, an organization that consists entirely of Muslim men, primarily
from the Middle East, poses the greatest immediate threat of mass terror-
ist killings.
Fortunately, it is also no doubt true that only a tiny proportion of
Middle Eastern men are affiliated with al Qaeda. A similar pattern can
occur in other settings: Even if race or ethnicity is a strong predictor of
criminal behavior, an individual member of the relevant groups is very
unlikely to be a criminal. For example, it could simultaneously be true
that 90% of major cocaine traffickers on 1-95 are black and Hispanic, 40
and that 99.9% of black and Hispanic motorists on that highway are not
drug traffickers of any description. When this type of juxtaposition does
occur-and we rarely, if ever, have information this definitive-choosing
suspects by race will increase the efficiency of the police. But the benefit
to law enforcement may be slight, and it will come at a price that may be
very steep, depending on the other factors we consider.
C. What Does the Government Do Based on Race or Ethnicity?
Southeastern Michigan has the largest concentration of Arab Ameri-
cans and Near Eastern visitors in the country, perhaps 300,000 or more,
including 521 of the 600 or so Michigan residents on the Justice Depart-
ment's initial interview list.4 1 These subjects were contacted by letters
from the local United States Attorney that said:
Your name was brought to our attention because, among other
things, you came to Michigan on a visa from a country where
there are groups that support, advocate, or finance interna-
tional terrorism. We have no reason to believe that you are, in
any way, associated with terrorist activities. Nevertheless, you
may know something that could be helpful in our efforts. 42
They were then asked to call the United States Attorney's office by a given
date to set up an appointment for an interview. 43
In a national poll in late November 2001, 79% of respondents said
that they approve of this program.44 Two years earlier, as we have men-
40. Gross & Barnes, supra note 27, at 57 tbl.18.
41. Telephone Interview with John Bell, supra note 22; see also Naftali Bendavid,
Interview Letters go to 500 in Michigan, Chi. Trib., Nov. 27, 2001, § 1, at 1 (noting that
federal officials sought to interview over 500 Middle Eastern men in Michigan); Lengel,
supra note 14.
42. Letter from Jeffrey Collins, U.S. Att'y, E.D. Mich. and Robert P. Cares, Asst. U.S.
Att'y, E.D. Mich. (Nov. 26, 2001) [hereinafter Letter] (emphasis omitted) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Lengel, supra note 14 (publishing text from letter used by
U.S. Attorney's office).
43. Letter, supra note 42.
44. Richard Morin & Claudia Deane, Most Americans Back U.S. Tactics; Poll Finds
Little Worry Over Rights, Wash. Post, Nov. 29, 2001, at Al; Roper Data Base, supra note 1
(describing results from ABC News, Wash. Post Poll, Nov. 27, 2001, question 18, accession
#0392049).
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tioned, 81% said they disapproved of "racial profiling."45 Much of the
change was a reaction to the September 11 attacks, an issue we address
below, but the high level of support for the Justice Department's plan
may also reflect the nature of the investigation, at least as initially
presented.
The interviews are described as purely voluntary, though that is
something of an exaggeration. The constitutional regulation of stops and
searches is based in part on the premise that the average citizen feels free
to ignore an armed police officer who asks for identification, or to look in
the trunk, and that the nearly universal compliance with such demands is
voluntary. 46 This is a convenient fiction even under ordinary circum-
stances, let alone in this context. The typical recipient of one of these
letters-a foreign student on a temporary visa from a country with an
authoritarian and sometimes abusive government-must be forgiven if
he interprets the request for an interview as an order. Worse, he may be
right to do so. An Immigration and Naturalization Service memorandum
that has been publicized in the press suggests that some of those inter-
viewed might be detained without bond if the "investigators [develop] an
interest in them. -47 A lot turns on how this investigation is actually car-
ried out, a point we will return to. For now, let us suppose the govern-
ment conducts a program that is as voluntary and respectful as possible.
Assuming for the moment that the Justice Department's investiga-
tion does rely on ethnic profiling, this is not the racial or ethnic profiling
we are used to hearing about. That would be more like the following:
Put a list of the license plate numbers of cars driven by Middle Eastern
men on a law enforcement computer network and ask local police of-
ficers to look out for them, pull them over if they see them, search their
cars on any plausible pretext, and arrest them on any possible charge.
Both programs use ethnic information to identify their subjects. The dif-
ference, and it is vast, is what the government does to those people once
they have been identified.
Perhaps the worst instance of ethnic profiling in American history
began on February 19, 1942, when President Franklin Delano Roosevelt
signed Executive Order 9066,48 giving the Secretary of War the power to
order over 110,000 Japanese Americans on the west coast to be "reset-
tie [d]" in "relocation centers" for the duration of the war.49 The Japa-
nese internment was a disgraceful episode in American history. It is fre-
45. See supra note I and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (noting that "mere police
questioning does not constitute a seizure"). For an extended doctrinal discussion of this
issue, see David Cole, No Equal Justice: Race and Class in the American CriminalJustice
System 27-34 (1999).
47. The Questioning: Memo Adds to Suspicions of Immigrants on Interviews, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 29, 2001, at B6.
48. Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092 (1938-1943).
49. See Greg Robinson, By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of
Japanese Americans 127-28, 130-31 (2001).
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quently cited as the prime example of the evil things we might do if we
pursue racial profiling in response to the attacks of September 11. 5 0 But
what if, instead of being forced to sell their property for pennies on the
dollar, to leave their homes, schools, farms, jobs, and communities, and
to spend three and a half years behind barbed wire, Japanese Americans
had been asked to report for interviews with the FBI? What if in addition
they were required-because of their ethnicity-to report their wherea-
bouts to the police periodically, but were otherwise allowed to lead their
lives as they wished? Perhaps these policies, especially the second, would
also have been unjustified, even during an all out war. Certainly both
programs-like the actual internment program-would have involved
ethnic profiling. Under any name, however, these sorts of ethnic profil-
ing would have been far preferable to the relocation and imprisonment
that were in fact ordered.
The range of things the government can do on the basis of racial or
ethnic information is enormous. If mass imprisonment defines the high
end (short of torture or execution), paying close attention may define
the low end. After September 11, nobody could seriously complain about
the FBI paying more attention to reports of suspicious behavior by Saudi
men than to similar reports about Hungarian women-even though as a
consequence many more Saudi men will set off false alarms. In between
there are infinite gradations, as the government's conduct becomes in-
creasingly intrusive, disruptive, frightening, and humiliating. There are,
however, two important questions that cut across this terrain.
The first separates out a class of cases near the bottom of the slope:
Did the investigators impinge on the suspect by confronting him, or by
covertly invading his privacy? If not-if, in the clearest case, the authori-
ties did no more than gather information at a distance, from public
sources-the worst consequences will be minimal. More often than not,
the suspect will never know. We do not mean to say that such activities
are therefore justified. A fascinating recent study, for example, analyzed
computer traffic from police cruisers in a predominantly white suburban
town and found that the officers were more likely to run license-plate
checks on cars with black drivers than on cars with white drivers, and
increasingly so the farther they were from the border of the neighboring,
black-dominated metropolis. 51 The only good thing we can say about the
profiling in that case is that few of its victims ever realized their status.
The second question is more important because it affects the experi-
ence of people who do know what is being done to them: Is the subject
treated as one of us or as one of them, as a law abiding person to be
checked out or as a criminal to be caught and punished? Security check-
50. See, e.g., Leanora Minai, Cops Target Local Mideast Men, St. Petersburg Times,
Nov. 28, 2001, at Al.
51. Albert J. Meehan & Michael Ponder, Race and Place: The Ecology of Racial
Profiling African-American Motorists 10-11 (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
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points are democratic; everybody must go through them, so no stigma is
attached to the process. Some people these days get angry if they are not
checked carefully enough, 52 but even those who are asked to open their
bags or scanned by hand are treated essentially like ordinary members of
the public. The operating assumption for any individual, Muslim or Pres-
byterian, is that she will clear security and rejoin the crowd. On the other
hand, a passenger who is kicked off an airliner (for good reasons or bad)
is treated as a presumptive terrorist. Not only are his plans disrupted, but
he is singled out and humiliated in public.
The paradigmatic context for racial profiling-the setting in which
the term was coined-is drug interdiction on the highway.5 3 From the
point of view of the state trooper, a motorist who is stopped and searched
is a potential catch, a shot at a big, career building drug bust. But most of
those who are searched are totally innocent, and from their viewpoint the
process looks and feels very different. You are stopped for a minor or
nonexistent traffic violation; the officer scrutinizes your car carefully
through the window and then tells you to step outside; he asks you
pointed questions about your trip, your plans, your companions, your
friends, and perhaps expresses doubts about the honesty of your answers;
he asks for permission to search the car; if you agree, he rummages
through your vehicle and belongings; if you refuse, he calls for backup
and a police dog to sniff your car for drugs.54 Long before that point,
however, you realize that you've been targeted. The trooper is not going
through a routine so he can let you go on your way and move on to his
next task. He believes you are a drug dealer; he wants to find drugs on
you. He wants to prove that you are a criminal, preferably a big criminal,
and will be disappointed if he finds no drugs; he might get mad.
52. See generally John Reid Blackwell, Flights Mostly On Schedule; Screening Steps
Largely Invisible, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 19, 2002, at Al (illustrating the positive
reaction of passengers subjected to increased airport security measures); All Things
Considered, Analysis: Increased Security for U.S. Airlines (NPR radio broadcast, Jan. 18,
2002), available at 2002 WL 3494730 (reporting positive reactions of passengers subjected
to increased airport security measures).
53. A search of the LEXIS All News file reveals that the first use of the terms "racial
profile" or "racial profiling" in a published news article on any aspect of law enforcement
was in a February 1990 story about drug interdiction by the NewJersey state police. Joseph
F. Sullivan, New Jersey Police are Accused of Minority Arrest Campaigns, N.Y. Times, Feb.
19, 1990, at B3. The first use of either of these terms in a published court opinion is in
United States v. Whren, 53 F.3d 371, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1995), aff'd, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
(concerning drug interdiction in a city), but several earlier opinions on highway drug
interdiction refer to "race-based profiles" or the use of race in "drug courier profiles." See,
e.g., United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332, 337 (D. Colo. 1990) (detailing the use of
"'profiling' based on race" by a county drug task force); Lowery v. Commonwealth, 388
S.E.2d 265, 268 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (concluding that "the officer had adequate
justification, independent of the profile using race as a factor, to stop the defendant's
vehicle").
54. See, e.g., Webb, supra note 28 (describing stop and search procedures for the
California Highway Patrol); AngelaJ. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. Miami L.
Rev. 425, 438-40 (1997) (describing a stop by Maryland State Police).
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Those of us who have not been through this sort of experience prob-
ably underestimate its impact.55 To be treated as a criminal is a basic
insult to a person's self image and to his position in society. It cannot
easily be shrugged off. Of course, many victims of racial profiling are not
surprised by this treatment. They know why they were stopped-which
makes it worse. It's bad enough to have the accidental misfortune of be-
ing mistaken for a bad guy; it's worse to feel that you are assumed to be a
criminal because of your race. Short of imprisonment, intimidation, or
physical abuse, most of the pain of racial profiling is caused by treating
law abiding people like criminals. 56
D. How Strong Is the Evidence of a Racially Identified Suspect's Guilt or
Innocence?
Our normal operating assumption about racial profiling is that the
typical individual who is profiled is very unlikely to be guilty. (Certainly
no more than a tiny proportion of the men interviewed by the FBI are
members of al Qaeda, if any.) The less likely the guilt of any individual,
the higher the proportion of innocent people among those affected, and
the higher the social cost of the practice. But what if the evidence of
individual guilt becomes much stronger? Would this change our view on
the use of profiling? The New York City Police Department's anti-gun
campaign is a good illustration. FromJanuary 1998 through March 1999,
guns were found on only 2.5% of the nearly 60,000 people who were
stopped for suspected gun possession-one person in 40.57 Assuming
the police did use race to decide whom to stop and frisk, would we feel
differently about the practice if they had found weapons on 90% of those
they searched? How about 30%?
55. On May 8, 1992, Robert Wilkins, an African American lawyer who at the time
worked at the District of Columbia Public Defender Service, was driving from Chicago to
Washington, D.C. with several family members on a trip to his grandfather's funeral. They
were stopped by a Maryland State Police trooper in an instance of racial profiling that
triggered a major lawsuit against the Maryland State Police. Eight years later, Mr. Wilkins
described the experience in testimony before the United States Senate:
So there we were. Standing outside the car in the rain, lined up along the road,
with police lights flashing, officers standing guard, and a German Shepherd
jumping on top of, underneath, and sniffing every inch of our vehicle. We were
criminal suspects; yet we were just trying to use the interstate highway to travel
from our homes to a funeral. It is hard to describe the frustration and pain you
feel when people presume you to be guilty for no good reason and you know that
you are innocent.
Racial Profiling Within Law Enforcement Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 106th
Cong. 19 (2000) (statement of Robert L. Wilkins).
56. For a thoughtful discussion of one of the implications of this point-namely, that
even if racial profiling proves impossible to root out entirely, much of the harm it inflicts
could be ameliorated by better, more respectful treatment of those the police target-see
William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 Yale L.J. (forthcoming June 2002).
57. OAG Report, supra note 19, at 118 tbl.I.B.3.
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If racial profiling in the near absence of evidence of an individual
suspect's guilt represents one end of the spectrum, the other end exists
only in theory. Imagine a suspect who is found standing over a dead body
holding a smoking gun. What if the first officer on the scene admits that
he arrested the suspect because of his race, as well as the obvious nonra-
cial reasons? If this unlikely hypothetical came to life, we'd condemn that
officer's racism; we might want to have him disciplined; but we probably
would not think that the defendant is entitled to be released. Courts that
say that under the Fourth Amendment race may be considered in a pro-
file as one factor among several 58 may have this issue in mind. The more
factors the officer considers-the more information he uses-the more
likely it is that he is accurate in his suspicion. But these cases present a
different situation from the one in our smoking gun hypothetical. In our
hypothetical, race was not a necessary cause of the arrest: Obviously the
suspect would have been arrested anyway by an officer who did not rely
on race. In the usual Fourth Amendment profiling case, race is a neces-
sary element in the profile, along with others; the suspect is stopped be-
cause he is black and male, young, out after dark, driving a sports car, etc.
The use of other factors of this sort is inevitable-even the most commit-
ted racial profiler does not choose suspects at random from an entire
racial group-but they do not point to an individual who is uniquely
likely to be guilty.
A suspect's race alone is never strong evidence of guilt. There is no
serious crime that is committed by all, or most, or even a large fraction of
the members of any racial group. 59 But race together with other informa-
tion about the suspect can form a pattern that is persuasive to any degree.
The usual situation does not involve profiling but case specific informa-
tion. If reliable witnesses report that they saw a white man running from
the scene of a murder and going into a bar in which there are only three
white men, the police have enough information to detain all three-"rea-
sonable suspicion"-and they might have probable cause to arrest them
as well. If there is only one white man in the bar, there might just be
enough to convict by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
While a suspect's race alone is never proof of guilt, a suspect's race is
frequently powerful evidence of innocence. If the eyewitnesses to a mur-
der are right and the killer was a white man, that is conclusive evidence of
the innocence of any person who is black, or a woman. (The witnesses
could in theory be mistaken, but even so the police are justified in treat-
ing their description as very strong evidence of innocence of any person
of the wrong race or sex.) This may be the real reason why courts uni-
formly agree that police officers may rely on racially specific descriptions
58. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
59. On the other hand, there are some minor offenses, such as speeding on the
highway, that virtually everyone commits, regardless of race. See, e.g., State v. Soto, 734
A.2d 350, 352-53 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996) (citing statistical study of traffic violations
by race); Gross & Barnes, supra note 27, at 38-39.
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of criminal suspects, despite the prohibition against the use of racial clas-
sifications. 60 Some courts explain this rule by saying that this is not a
"racial classification" for Fourteenth Amendment purposes, but that, of
course, begs the question.6 1 This is a racial classification as that phrase is
used in ordinary language; if it is not a racial classification under the
Fourteenth Amendment, this is simply because the relevant court is pre-
pared to say that this use of race is legal. It might be more informative to
say that the state has a compelling interest in not investigating people for
crimes when they are known to be innocent because it is wasteful, irra-
tional, and profoundly unjust to do so.
E. What are the Likely Benefits of Racial Profiling?
The post-September 11 change in climate on civil liberties has a sin-
gle cause: mass murder by organized foreign terrorists. We've seen it
done, spectacularly, on live TV. It's an old point: The greater the threat,
the more we are willing to accept restrictions on our liberty, and the less
precision we demand from the government in response. Justice Robert
Jackson's dissent in Brinegar v. United States may still be the most widely
cited statement of this position, at least in the Fourth Amendment
context:
If ... a child is kidnaped and the officers throw a roadblock
about the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would
be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The of-
ficers might be unable to show probable cause for searching any
particular car. However, I should candidly strive hard to sustain
such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it
might be reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was
the only way to save a threatened life and detect a vicious crime.
But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a
bootlegger.6 2
The point was recently echoed by the Supreme Court in Florida v. JL.
6 3
There, in holding that an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is
not, without more, sufficient to justify a stop and frisk, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg took pains to note:
60. See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal
Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 1075, 1083-88 (2001) (discussing
scholarly views and judicial analyses of race-based suspect selection); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214, 237-43 (1983) (describing
constraints on the use of racial classifications in criminal proceedings).
61. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 336-39 (2d Cir. 2000) (asserting
that police who stopped and questioned African American plaintiffs based on a victim's
physical description of the perpetrator "did not engage in a suspect racial classification
that would draw strict scrutiny").
62. 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949).
63. 529 U.S. 266 (2000).
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The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the
circumstances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous
tip might be so great as to justify a search even without a show-
ing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a
person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we
demand for a report of a person carrying a firearm before the
police can constitutionally conduct a frisk.64
How does this apply to racial profiling? If we thought we could re-
duce the risk of hijacking by 15%, would thatjustify searching every Mid-
dle Eastern man who boards a plane? This may well be within the current
national consensus that we must take strong measures to protect our-
selves. On the other hand, the same people who would accept severe
measures (including ones based on race) that offered any promise of re-
ducing a genuine threat of nuclear terrorism, might still readily condemn
a racial profiling program that efficiently combats the threat of marijuana
possession or ticket scalping. And even people who favor the Justice De-
partment's post-September 11 interview program might be angry if the
Department sent out letters to 5000 Mexican nationals, almost all of them
law abiding, asking them to come in for interviews because:
Your name was brought to our attention because, among other
things, you came to the United States on a visa from a country
where there are groups that engage in or finance international
drug trafficking. We have no reason to believe that you are, in
any way, associated with drug trafficking. Nevertheless, you may
know something that could be helpful in our efforts.
There are two parts to this calculation: How great is the harm we are
fighting? And how likely is our conduct to be useful? When the danger is
extreme, we may accept unpleasant methods that have only a slight
chance of success. But it is one thing to sketch out these calculations on
paper, and quite another to do so in a real emergency. We never actually
know either the magnitude of the danger or the effectiveness of possible
countermeasures. Urgency and fear do not improve ourjudgment. They
may lead us to overestimate the danger, or the value of preventive steps,
or both. Racism and ethnic prejudice may color every step of the process.
Most Americans probably feel particularly threatened because the Sep-
tember 11 suicide hijackers were foreign, and some may be especially
fearful because they were Arabs. This fear may cause us to exaggerate the
danger of future attacks in general, and of attacks by Middle Eastern ter-
rorists in particular. As a result, we may overestimate the effect of racially
specific security measures. And unfortunately, we are more willing to ac-
cept aggressive measures when they target small and politically dis-
empowered groups, specifically racial and ethnic minorities, and foreign
nationals.
64. Id. at 273-74.
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III.
Applying this scheme to several concrete examples helps place racial
profiling in the context of other police practices that take race or ethnic-
ity into account. The illustrations that we use range from clear instances
of racial profiling, to ambiguous situations, to cases that do not fit the
definition of racial profiling but are equally disturbing all the same.
When we consider them in light of the entire set of factors we have dis-
cussed, we see that the appropriateness of a particular law enforcement
practice turns on a more complicated assessment than whether the label
"racial profiling" properly applies.
Highway Drug Stops. The archetypal example of racial profiling is the
practice that gave rise to the phrase "Driving While Black": racial profil-
ing in traffic stops in general, and as an aspect of highway drug interdic-
tion in particular. This is an easy case. There is overwhelming evidence
that the police do rely on race to decide whom to stop and to search.
65
Law enforcement sources frequently claim that drug trafficking in the
United States is dominated by blacks and Hispanics; but there is little
doubt that the drug culture in this country is general, and that the great
majority of illicit drug users are white.66 The treatment of suspects who
are profiled is heavy handed and humiliating.67 The probability of guilt
for any individual who is stopped is low; few are carrying any drugs at all,
and only a tiny proportion are drug traffickers. 68 Finally, racial profiling
on the highway produces no discernible benefits. The entire war on
drugs is fraught with ambiguity and ambivalence, and many commenta-
tors have concluded that the effort to reduce drug consumption by limit-
ing supply is doomed to failure.69 We need not reach this question, how-
ever, because the specific program at issue is ineffective by any standard.
Fishing for drug couriers in the immense stream of cars on interstate
highways is a hopeless strategy for eliminating drug trafficking; it proba-
bly has no impact whatsoever on drug markets. 70 It should be no surprise
that racial profiling on the highway is almost uniformly condemned.
Gun Searches. The New York City Police Department's anti-gun cam-
paign is a harder case.71 The evidence that the police used race to decide
whom to stop and frisk for weapons is less clear than the evidence that
state police officers do so for highway stops, but let us assume that they
65. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
66. See Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Summary of Findings from the 2000
National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 21-22 (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.
samhsa.gov/oas/NHSDA/2kNHSDA.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
67. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
68. Gross & Barnes, supra note 27, at 56.
69. See Steven B. Duke & Albert C. Gross, America's Longest War 203-07 (1993);
Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, in The Crisis in Drug Prohibition 13, 21
(1990); Samuel Walker, Sense and Nonsense about Crime and Drugs 262 (3d ed. 1994).
70. Gross & Barnes, supra note 27, at 106-09.
71. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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did. Let us also assume that the police are correct in their claim that
blacks and Hispanics were much more likely than whites to carry guns.
The treatment of profiled suspects was coercive, humiliating, and some-
times violent, and yet only a small minority-one in 40-were actually
found to be carrying guns. On the other side of the ledger, the benefits
of this campaign may have been substantial. The murder and violent
crime rate decreased sharply in the mid-1990s, and at least some of the
drop may have been due to this effort.72 Nonetheless, we believe that
racial profiling, if it occurred, cannot be justified on practical or legal
grounds. The cost was very high-dozens of thousands of unarmed
young men stopped and searched in public, 73 an ugly crisis in relations
between the Police Department and minority communities74-and the
benefits speculative. The status quo in 1994 was serious, but judging
from patterns in other cities, it is fairly clear that crime would have
dropped to some extent regardless of police practices; 75 and we have no
idea whether less troubling methods would have succeeded as well or
better.
Racial Incongruity. In some contexts, an individual's race may pro-
vide a substantial basis for suspicion even in the absence of information
about any specific criminal activity. In the classic case, the police justify
the stop of a white person in a neighborhood where the great majority of
residents are black or Hispanic on the ground that virtually all white peo-
ple who go to that neighborhood do so to buy drugs. As a factual matter,
the police may be right; in a few cases, courts have accepted their judg-
ment and upheld the stops.76 Most courts, however, have held that such
stops are unconstitutional because being racially "out of place" does not
72. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Declining Homicide in New York City: A Tale of Two
Trends, 88J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1277, 1313-18 (1998) (concluding that policing may
have caused or helped cause drop in gun related homicides); see also David Garland,
Criminology, Crime Control, and "The American Difference," 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1137,
1150 (1998) (arguing that street stops and searches discourage casual gun possession and
thus reduce the potential violence of unplanned street incidents).
73. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
74. See Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race,
and Disorder in New York City, 28 Fordham Urb. L.J. 457, 462 (2000);Jerome H. Skolnick
& Abigail Caplovitz, Guns, Drugs, and Profiling: Ways to Target Guns and Minimize Racial
Profiling, 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 415-17 (2001).
75. See Fox Butterfield, Cities Reduce Crime and Conflict Without New York-Style
Hardball, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 2000, at Al.
76. See, e.g., State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) (noting fact that when a
person is observed in a neighborhood not frequented by persons of his ethnic background
it "is quite often a basis for an officer's initial suspicion"); State v. Ruiz, 504 P.2d 1307, 1310
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding that officers were justified in stopping a person based on
police testimony that it was "unusual to see a person of either 'white' or Mexican descent"
in the area and that the few people police had noticed in the past "were there for the
purpose of purchasing narcotics"); cf. United States v. Magda, 409 F. Supp. 734, 740
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), rev'd, 547 F.2d 756, 759 (2d Cir. 1976) (reversing trial court that had
suppressed evidence where defendant was stopped entirely because he participated in an
interracial interaction in "narcotics-prone" area).
1432 [Vol. 102:1413
RACIAL PROFILJNG UNDER ATTACK
create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity-notwithstanding that
the officers' conduct is ostensibly based on localized assessments of the
significance of race in particular settings, rather than on global assess-
ments about the propensities of a racial or ethnic group. 77 A better ex-
planation for these decisions might be that arresting occasional drug
users and retail dealers is not a sufficient benefit to justify stopping and
searching people who cross common lines of residential and social segre-
gation, even if the factual premise is correct. Indeed, our interest in end-
ing racial segregation is so strong that there may be no circumstances in
which social integration should be considered a proper basis for suspi-
cion of criminality. 78
Underworld Segregation. A suspect's race, together with other factors,
might also provide strong grounds for suspicion in another setting: inves-
tigation of a segregated criminal organization. Suppose that the FBI is
investigating the activities of the Gambino crime family, an organization
whose membership consists almost entirely of men of Sicilian descent.
Agents hear from a reliable informant that a meeting is to take place
between a known Gambino capo and another, unknown crime family
member. Wiretap information confirms that the purpose of the meeting
is a payoff for a hit. Agents set up physical surveillance at the meeting
site-a park in the Bensonhurst section of Queens, New York-but fail to
spot the known crime family member. They then see two other men walk
by, an African American and someone who seems to be Italian American.
If the agents ignore the African American and focus their attention on
the Italian American, are they engaged in racial profiling? Like the Jus-
tice Department's interview program, this case defies categorization. 79
The agents may be following up on case-specific information that the per-
petrators of a specific crime-namely, conspiracy to murder-are Sicil-
ian, but they may also be relying on a global assessment that Sicilians are
more likely to be involved in this sort of organized crime. In context, of
course, the distinction makes little difference. Either way, the agents'
77. See, e.g., People v. Bower, 597 P.2d 115, 119 (Cal. 1979) (stating that "[a]
person's racial status is not an 'unusual' circumstance and the presence of an individual of
one race in an area inhabited primarily by members of another race is not a sufficient basis
to suggest that crime is afoot"); State v. Letts, 603 A.2d 562, 566 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992) (stating that the state cannot view a person's race as indicative of probable criminal
activity); State v. Kuhn, 517 A.2d 162, 165 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (declaring that
"[n] o rational inference may be drawn from the race of one to be detained that he may be
engaged in criminal activities").
78. A common example of racial profiling that is directed at those who are seen as
racially "out of place" is the practice in some police departments of stopping minorities
who cross into well-to-do white communities. See Meehan & Ponder, supra note 51, at 2-3,
18-19. Stops of this sort are particularly troubling because they have the effect-
sometimes, no doubt, the intended effect-of reinforcing racial segregation.
79. Professor Richard Banks describes this situation as a case of racial profiling, but
one that is less disturbing than the common one because it does not embody a broad
stereotype about the criminal propensities of a racial group, and therefore is less
stigmatizing and objectionable to the group concerned. Banks, supra note 60, at 1097-99.
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conduct is minimally intrusive (surveillance in a public place); and either
way, if the man they follow leads them to the capo they will have more
than enough information to arrest both men for conspiracy to commit
murder, if they want to terminate the investigation at that point.
The Wen Ho Lee Case. Charges of racial profiling are usually ad-
dressed to ongoing law enforcement policies, but occasionally they have
been directed at the investigation of a single matter. One of the most
complex and ambiguous cases of this sort is the prosecution of Dr. Wen
Ho Lee.80 Lee, a Taiwan-born naturalized citizen and a physicist at the
Los Alamos National Laboratories, was suspected of providing nuclear
secrets to the People's Republic of China. He was indicted for fifty-nine
felony counts of violating the Atomic Energy Act and ten counts each of
unlawfully obtaining and unlawfully retaining national defense informa-
tion. He was suspected but not charged with espionage. Lee was arrested
and held without bail in solitary confinement for nearly ten months,
shackled whenever he was led out of his cell, and closely watched at all
times, including family visits. Ultimately, Dr. Lee was released with an
apology from the judge, and pled guilty to one felony count of violating
nuclear security statutes, with a sentence of time already served. 8 1 Dr.
Lee has admitted illegally downloading secret data on nuclear weapons,
but he has always denied spying for China.
One of the complaints about the Wen Ho Lee case is that the investi-
gation was based on racial profiling.8 2 We don't know enough to say
whether that is a plausible description, but let us assume that the case did
not involve racial profiling as we define it. Let us assume, for example,
that the FBI had reliable information that an American nuclear spy was in
contact with Chinese intelligence, and that the person in question was
fluent in Mandarin.8 3 Given that information, it would not have been
racial profiling to confine the investigation to Chinese speaking suspects,
since that restriction would have been based on information about the
perpetrator of a particular crime rather than on a prediction about the
criminal propensities of Chinese American scientists in general. We have
no reason to believe that the FBI had such information. Our point is that
80. United States v. Lee, No. CR 99-1417JP (D.N.M. Aug. 31, 2000) (mem.), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/wh-release-opinion.htmI (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); see also United States v. Lee, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1324 (D.N.M. 2000); United
States v. Lee, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1280 (D.N.M. 1999).
81. Statement by Judge in Los Alamos Case, With Apology for Abuse of Power, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 24, 2000, at A25.
82. Matthew Purdy, The Making of a Suspect: The Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 4, 2001, at Al; Matthew Purdy & James Sterngold, The Prosecution Unravels: The
Case of Wen Ho Lee, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 2001, at Al.
83. This assumption may well be contrary to the facts. According to news reports, a
classified Department of Justice report on the Wen Ho Le case criticizes the FBI
investigators, among other things, for failing to consider the real possibility that no
espionage had in fact occurred. Dan Eggen, Report Details More FBI Blunders in Wen Ho
Lee Probe, Wash. Post, Aug. 27, 2001, at Al.
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this assumption would hardly change anything in the debate over Dr.
Lee's case. His supporters would continue to argue that even if it was
likely that some ethnically Chinese person committed espionage, there
was little evidence that this Chinese American man was guilty-certainly
no evidence that would have justified the harsh treatment he received-
and that the government's willingness to treat him as it did on so flimsy a
basis reflected racism. On the other side, the government's defenders
would continue to argue that the magnitude of the risk from nuclear
espionage is so great that extreme measures are necessary to apprehend
spies and to prevent them from communicating with their handlers once
in custody. The factors that matter most are the quality of the evidence
against Dr. Lee and the harshness of the treatment he received on the
one hand, and the magnitude of the risk he may have posed on the other,
rather than the usual profiling questions: Did the FBI identify him by
ethnicity? And are Chinese Americans more likely than the rest of us to
spy for China?
The Oneonta Investigation. Another controversial investigation with ra-
cial overtones began at 2 a.m. on September 4, 1992, in the small town of
Oneonta, New York, when someone broke into the house of a seventy-
seven year old woman, attacked her, and fled, all under cover of darkness.
The victim described the assailant as a young black man with a knife, and
told the police that he had cut his hand.8 4 Over the next several days the
police located every black male student in the local college, questioned
them, and inspected their hands for cuts. They then did the same for
every other nonwhite man they could find, and at least one nonwhite
woman-over 200 people in all. Their objective, according to the investi-
gator in charge, was "to examine the hands of all the black people in the
community. '8 5
The Second Circuit held that those stopped and questioned in One-
onta had no cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause because
the police were acting on the victim's racial description rather than their
own racial stereotypes or preferences.8 6 For the same reason, we would
not classify this as a case of racial profiling. But the incident is disturbing
all the same for reasons we have discussed: The police conducted an ag-
gressive investigation, stopping and questioning hundreds of innocent
people, with some unpleasantness along the way; they did so on the basis
of extremely limited information; they were responding to a serious
crime, but not an emergency. The police were criticized for doing some-
84. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2000), reh'g en banc denied,
235 F.3d 769, 770 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Banks, supra note 60, at 1078-81 (providing
extensive analysis of the case).
85. Brown, 235 F.3d at 780 (Calabresi,J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
86. Brown, 221 F.3d at 337-38.
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thing they would never have done if the criminal had been white. 87 As
the Second Circuit noted, this technique would be hopelessly ineffective
for a white suspect because whites are a much larger group, the great
majority of the population in Oneonta. 88 But in operation it was equally
ineffective for a black suspect, and it is hard to believe that the police
would have considered treating the white residents of Oneonta in this
humiliating manner in an attempt to solve a single burglary and assault,
even if it were feasible. What is most striking from our point of view is
that the problem with the Oneonta investigation was not its racial speci-
ficity but the number of innocent people affected, and the manner in
which they were treated. If the police had stopped and questioned black
men only but had confined themselves to those few who were in the vicin-
ity near the time of the crime, or if they had asked the neighbors if they
had seen any black men in the area, no one would have blinked.
CONCLUSION
To return to the Justice Department's program: Does the plan to
interview thousands of Middle Eastern men who came here within the
last two years on nonimmigrant visas constitute ethnic profiling? The an-
swer turns out to be a draw.89 It is ethnic profiling to the extent that the
FBI is operating on a general assumption that Middle Eastern men are
more likely than others to commit acts of terror; it is not to the extent
that the agents are pursuing case-specific information about the Septem-
ber 11 attacks, albeit in a dragnet fashion. In practice, we cannot sepa-
rate or distinguish between these two conditions.
We also think that neither the question nor the answer is all-impor-
tant. The Oneonta investigation was not racial profiling, but it was an
offensive and unjustified use of race all the same; so are similar cases in
which the police, acting on information that a particular criminal is a
black man, proceed to stop, search, and perhaps arrest an innocent black
man based solely on his race and sex. 90 The Justice Department's pro-
gram may or may not fall within our definitional line. Its wisdom and
morality, however, do not depend on the pigeonhole in which it is placed
but on what the Justice Department in fact does. Are the interviews con-
ducted respectfully, in a manner designed to seek out relevant informa-
87. See, e.g., Editorial, Discriminatory Searches, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1999, at A32
(stating that the Second Circuit panel "was apparently untroubled by the fact that this
technique would never be used against whites"); Bob Herbert, Editorial, Breathing While
Black, N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1999, at A29 (alleging that the police disregarded the rights and
humanity of the black citizens of Oneonta because of their race).
88. Brown, 221 F.3d at 338.
89. See supra Part II.A.
90. See, e.g., Washington v. Lambert, 98 F.3d 1181, 1194 (9th Cir. 1996) (upholding
verdict for two African American plaintiffs who had been stopped and searched solely on
account of their race); Dinitia Smith, Actor Resumes Role After Ordeal, N.Y. Times, July
22, 1999, at B3 (describing erroneous arrest and strip search of an African American
Broadway actor).
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don from those who are willing to give it? If so, the program is accept-
able; it may even be an example of good investigative work. On the other
hand, if the "voluntary" character of these interviews is merely a ruse-if
men against whom there is no evidence are treated as suspects and
demeaned-then the program is an intolerable form of ethnic
discrimination.
To be clear, whether the interviewees are "treated as suspects" in-
volves more than the tone in which the interviews are conducted. Visa
violations are very common, and many are ignored by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. Those who are interviewed, even if they are
lawfully in the United States themselves, may well know of others who
have committed immigration related offenses. In a worst case scenario,
the interviewees could be asked general questions about infractions of
which they are aware; for example: "Do you know of any other person
who is in the United States on an invalid or expired visa?" Many would
deny that they know of such violations, which would subject them to pros-
ecution for making a false statement to a federal agent,9 1 which in turn
would expose them to arrest, detention, felony prosecution, and possibly
deportation.
This is a worst case scenario. It probably will not happen.9 2 Our
point is simply this: The September 11 attacks and the threat of future
terrorism clearly require an intensive investigation. Given the extremity
of the threat and identity of the known terrorists, the government isjusti-
fied in focusing that investigation on Middle Eastern men despite the fact
that the public decision to do so has caused understandable pain and
anxiety for many Arab Americans. But that should be only the beginning
of our inquiry. In the end, what the Department of Justice does to those
it seeks to interview, for what reasons and on what basis, are more impor-
tant than the fact that they may have been initially selected for interviews
in part because of their ethnicity or national origin. The same logic ap-
plies to other facets of the Government's response to the September 11
attacks that we have not discussed, including the detention in the imme-
diate wake of the terror attacks of several hundred or more foreigners for
visa violations. We know little about how these people were selected for
detention or why. Suffice it to say, then, that because the consequences
for the detainees are very serious, it is highly important that the govern-
ment act on adequate information and for appropriate reasons.
Is all this to suggest that racial and ethnic profiling is less troubling
than we once thought? Not at all. It is certainly true that other race-
based practices by the Government can be as bad, or worse, in criminal
investigations as elsewhere. Nonetheless we should be deeply suspicious
of racial profiling, however mild the government's actions and however
91. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 1999).
92. Initial reports on the interview program do not suggest serious abuses. See Jodi
Wilgoren, Sweep of Foreign Men Half-Finished as Deadline Passes, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22,
2001, at B4.
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justified they may appear. Investigative choices that are made on the ba-
sis of global assumptions about the criminal propensities of racial or eth-
nic groups are stigmatizing. They reinforce the negative stereotypes on
which they are based because investigators are more likely to detect crimi-
nal behavior in groups they target than in the groups they overlook. This
is dangerous both because it may be misleading, and because it is humili-
ating to the targeted group. It is a substantial cost of the Justice Depart-
ment's interview program-whether or not it is ethnic profiling-that
many Arab Americans see it as a slap in the face of their entire ethnic
group.
Although we have paid close attention to the practical consequences
of specific courses of action, we do not think this a simple practical issue.
The problem of racially specific investigations cannot reliably be solved
by any direct cost-benefit analysis. We should not trust ourselves to make
close calls, or even not-so-close calls, in favor of relying on race or ethnic-
ity. It is too common, particularly in a crisis, to exaggerate the threat
from a strange or unpopular group, to overstate the effectiveness of an
aggressive response, and to underestimate or ignore the costs we inflict
on others. Our starting point should be a strong presumption that no
racial or ethnic group should be considered more suspicious or danger-
ous than any other. We have argued against overreliance on labels in
evaluating racially specific law enforcement practices. At the same time,
however, it is appropriate and important that racial profiling keep its ugly
name.
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